This is a local simulated-wallet portfolio project, not a production-certified financial service. The implementation plan is the authoritative status source; ADRs record design intent, not necessarily active controls. OWASP Top 10:2025 is a review framework, not a certification; names and order follow the official release.
| Asset | Threat | Current control or status |
|---|---|---|
| User credentials | Brute force | Account lockout after 5 failed logins for 30 minutes (LoginAttemptServiceTest); no general API/IP rate limiter |
| Passwords in DB | Database theft | BCrypt hashing (strength 12) |
| Stolen Access Token | Session hijacking | Short expiration: 15 minutes |
| Stolen Refresh Token | Long-term impersonation | SHA-256 session hashes, rotation, and revocation (SessionServiceTest) |
| Sensitive operations | Fraud / unauthorized access | Authorization and audit; TOTP is outside this educational release (DESIGN-001) |
| Data in transit | MITM | Local Compose uses HTTP; HTTPS is a requirement for any future public deployment, not an active local control |
| SQL Injection | DB manipulation | Prepared statements via Hibernate |
| Sensitive data in logs | Accidental exposure | Audit paths avoid reusable tokens; complete log-safety review is not claimed (AuditServiceTest) |
This is a mapping of tested evidence and residual work, not a claim that any category has been eliminated. See the official OWASP Top 10:2025.
| Category | Project evidence | Residual work / boundary |
|---|---|---|
| A01:2025 Broken Access Control | Role and ownership tests (AUTHZ-001/002, SecurityConfigTest) |
Tested route matrix, not an exhaustive assessment |
| A02:2025 Security Misconfiguration | SecurityConfig, schema validation and no SQL seed (SEC-001) |
Local HTTP and deployment settings require review before public use |
| A03:2025 Software Supply Chain Failures | CI dependency scan and CodeQL, pom.xml |
Actual scan results and dependency currency remain environment-dependent |
| A04:2025 Cryptographic Failures | BCrypt and hashed refresh sessions (SEC-003/004) | No production key-management or disk-encryption proof |
| A05:2025 Injection | DTO validation and JPA repository patterns (src/main/java) |
No exhaustive injection assessment |
| A06:2025 Insecure Design | PostgreSQL concurrency tests (TransactionPostgresIntegrationTest) |
TOTP and configurable limits are not part of this release (future guidance) |
| A07:2025 Authentication Failures | Refresh, lockout, and JWT account-state tests (SEC-004/005/006) | No TOTP or inactivity-timeout enforcement; assess for real users |
| A08:2025 Software or Data Integrity Failures | Versioned SQL and CI tests | No complete release/provenance assessment |
| A09:2025 Security Logging and Alerting Failures | AuditServiceTest and TX-001 |
External alerting and complete event coverage unverified |
| A10:2025 Mishandling of Exceptional Conditions | GlobalExceptionHandler, rollback tests |
Tested cases only; no universal fail-closed guarantee |
POST /auth/login
→ Validate credentials (username + BCrypt password)
→ Verify account is not locked
→ Generate Access Token (15 min) + Refresh Token (7 days)
→ Store only a SHA-256 refresh-token hash in user_sessions
→ Audit log login event
→ Return tokens to client
POST /auth/refresh
→ Validate Refresh Token (signature + expiration + active session hash)
→ Rotate Refresh Token (invalidate old one, generate new one)
→ Return new Access Token (15 min) + new Refresh Token
POST /auth/logout
→ Revoke Refresh Token session in user_sessions
→ Audit log logout event
→ Access Token naturally expires within 15 minutes
| Parameter | Value | Reason |
|---|---|---|
| Access Token TTL | 15 minutes | Short window if stolen |
| Refresh Token TTL | 7 days | Security/UX balance |
| Max inactivity | Not enforced | Token expiry is not an inactivity timer |
| Reauthentication | Current password is required for profile edits (UserService); no TOTP step-up for financial operations |
Distinguish password confirmation from MFA |
| Concurrent sessions | Allowed (tracked in DB) | Auditable per device |
A stolen Access Token (via XSS, log leak, etc.) can only be used for 15 minutes. With 24h tokens, an attacker gets nearly a full day of access. For a wallet, 15 minutes is the right balance between security and user experience (refresh is transparent when implemented correctly).
None of these is promised for this educational release. If this repository is used as a learning starting point, first define the new application's users, assets, threat model, regulatory obligations, and deployment environment. Do not copy a configuration value or database column and assume that it enforces a policy.
| Control not provided here | When to assess it | Why it matters / what a real design must include |
|---|---|---|
| MFA (for example, TOTP or phishing-resistant factors) | Real user accounts, privileged administrators, sensitive data, or high-risk actions | Reduces reliance on passwords alone. Enrollment, protected secret storage, recovery, reset, rate limiting, and replay prevention must all be designed and tested; a TOTP field is not MFA. OWASP MFA guidance. |
| Transaction-specific authorization | Real high-value transfers or actions needing explicit user approval | Login MFA does not prove approval of a particular recipient and amount. Bind the authorization to the transaction details and enforce it server-side. OWASP transaction authorization guidance. The historical $100 proposal is not an active threshold. |
| Per-transaction and daily financial limits | A system that can move real funds or must contain fraud/loss | Define amounts per currency, operations counted, reset window, and override ownership. Enforce atomically under concurrent requests; the app.transaction values here do not enforce limits. |
| HTTPS/TLS and secret/key management | Any use outside an isolated local demo, especially when credentials or tokens cross a network | TLS protects traffic confidentiality and integrity; encryption keys need controlled storage and rotation. Local HTTP and environment variables alone are not a deployment design. OWASP TLS guidance. |
| Email verification, broader abuse controls, monitoring, and inactivity policy | When email is a recovery/notification channel, the service is exposed to untrusted clients, or risk/compliance requires active session monitoring | Verify control of recovery addresses; add request-level throttling/alerting and a server-enforced inactivity rule where needed. Five-failure account lockout and JWT expiry are not substitutes for all of these controls. |
TOTP and configurable limits were considered in DESIGN-001/002 and deliberately left outside the final scope. ADR-004/005 preserve their historical rationale, not an obligation to implement them in this repository.
- Local Docker Compose uses HTTP. TLS is required before any future public deployment; this project is not intended for one.
- BCrypt with strength 12
- Passwords are never stored in plaintext or reversible formats
- Balances and amounts stored as
DECIMAL(19,4)— no rounding - Monetary precision is not encryption. Infrastructure encryption is a design delegation, not a verified local control (ADR-007).
- Audit logs never store sensitive data (passwords, full tokens)
- Minimum 256-bit entropy
- Stored exclusively as environment variable
JWT_SECRET - Never in source code, never in logs
ddl-autois nevercreateorupdatein any environment- Stack traces never reach the client
- Passwords are never logged or returned in any response
- JWT secret is never hardcoded — always environment variable
- Financial operations always run inside
@Transactional - Sensitive operations must generate audit evidence; coverage must be verified for each new flow
- Input validation is required on all endpoints (
@Valid)
This is an academic/portfolio project.
If you find a vulnerability, open an issue with the security label.