[carlospolop]

Blog URL

https://research.jfrog.com/post/shai-hulud-is-back-august

Blog Title

Shai-Hulud Is Back: August — Technical Analysis of the npm Supply-Chain Worm

Blog high summary

JFrog analyzes a 710 KB Shai-Hulud npm worm in keyv@6.0.0 and cacheable@2.5.1, spanning 400+ packages and 1,700+ versions. When lifecycle hooks run, setup.mjs launches math_init.js via installed or downloaded Bun 1.3.13; npm 12+ disables preinstall by default. A writable bypass_2fa npm token enables package-wide reinfection.

Stolen GitHub credentials plant VS Code/Claude hooks and a temporary Actions workflow that exfiltrates ${{ toJSON(secrets) }}; encrypted theft uses Ethereum/GitHub C2 and server-supplied eval code. Treat execution as compromise: revoke and rotate all reachable secrets, audit every branch and workflow, remove infected packages, and rebuild runners, build machines, and developer hosts.

PR changes

• src/pentesting-ci-cd/github-security/abusing-github-actions/gh-actions-npm-supply-chain-abuse.md: Documented GraphQL-based cross-branch hook placement and commit-pinned optional-dependency injection during trusted publishing.

Errors

mdbook build unavailable

[carlospolop]

Decision: keep

JFrog supports the cross-branch commit behavior and the protected-branch limitation. JFrog and Unit 42 describe the same targeted publishing path; the optional-dependency detail belongs in the existing paragraph, not a separate variant.

Head: 6d4c13e6d081dc83da11ee035d243e101153465f

[carlospolop]

merge