Flag response tests that never reach albedo's reflected body

.coderabbit.yaml

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
 # yaml-language-server: $schema=https://coderabbit.ai/integrations/schema.v2.json
 #
 # CodeRabbit organization config for the `coreruleset` GitHub org.
 #
@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@
 # Tone guidance appended to every review prompt. Max 250 chars (silently
 # truncated beyond that).
 tone_instructions: >-
   Be direct, with respect. Be concise. Assume positive intent. Flag bugs, security issues, false-positive risk and regressions, with a fix. Cite rule IDs, paranoia levels and affected variables. Skip style nits. No praise.
 
 # Opt in to early-access / beta features org-wide.
 early_access: true
@@ -316,7 +316,7 @@
         and the `TX:DETECTION_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@lt N"` skipAfter guards at the
         top of each detection file, carry only `id`, `phase`, `pass,nolog`,
         `tag:'OWASP_CRS'` and `ver`. Do not ask for msg, logdata, severity,
         paranoia-level, attack-type or capec metadata on them. A `tag:` value that is not in
         `util/APPROVED_TAGS` fails the crs-linter CI job — say so explicitly
         and tell the author to add it there in sorted position first.
 
@@ -373,7 +373,7 @@
         `crs-toolchain regex update <id>`.
 
     - path: "plugins/*.conf"
       # CRS plugins: coreruleset/plugins/ and the *-rule-exclusions-plugin repos.
       instructions: |
         This is a CRS plugin's seclang. Every invariant that applies to core
         rules applies here too: metadata completeness, approved tags, a
@@ -424,9 +424,9 @@
         Changed default without justification — anomaly score thresholds
         (`tx.inbound_anomaly_score_threshold`,
         `tx.outbound_anomaly_score_threshold`), `tx.blocking_paranoia_level`,
         `tx.detection_paranoia_level`, `tx.critical/error/warning/notice_anomaly_score`,
         sampling percentage, `tx.enforce_bodyproc_urlencoded`, allowed methods,
         allowed content types, request body limits, or `tx.crs_validate_utf8_encoding`.
         Each of these is a behaviour change for every default deployment and
         needs the reasoning in the PR description.
 
@@ -550,6 +550,15 @@
         different string than intended; percent-encode it and keep the
         readable form in `desc`.
 
+        Response test that never reaches the response — response-phase tests
+        (RESPONSE-95x) POST to the albedo backend's `/reflect`, which parses
+        the request body as a JSON reflection spec and returns only its `body`
+        (or base64 `encodedBody`) field. A plain string gets `400 Invalid JSON
+        in request body`; JSON without `body` returns an empty response. Either
+        way RESPONSE_BODY never holds the payload, so a negative test passes
+        without testing anything. Require `data: '{"body": "<payload>"}'`.
+        albedo ignores the request `Content-Type`, so don't flag that.
+
         Only positive tests — a new or widened pattern should come with at
         least one benign payload asserting it does NOT match, especially for
         short patterns or ones that could hit hashes, IDs, or file paths.
@@ -661,7 +670,7 @@
   # Checks are mode: warning, except "AI Use Without Disclosure" (error). An
   # error-mode check blocks merge only while auto approvals are enabled
   # (request_changes_workflow: true). Escalate another check to mode: error
   # only after confirming a low false-positive rate on real CRS PRs. Check names are capped at 50 chars
   # and instructions at 10,000 chars by the schema.
   pre_merge_checks:
     description:
@@ -1030,12 +1039,12 @@
       - name: "OWASP Security (Web, API & LLM)"
         mode: warning
         instructions: |
           Flag ⚠️ WARNING: <description> — <fix> on any affected line or block for:
 
           ## Web (OWASP Top 10)
 
           Broken Access Control — missing authorization checks, insecure direct object references,
           CORS misconfiguration, privilege escalation paths, forced browsing to authenticated resources.
 
           Cryptographic Failures — hardcoded secrets or API keys, weak algorithms (MD5, SHA1, DES),
           unencrypted sensitive data in transit or at rest, weak or expired TLS configuration,