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Security: h8d13/caesar

Security

.github/SECURITY.md

Security

Policy

Supported Versions

Only the latest master is supported. Older tags receive no patches.

Reporting a Vulnerability

Please do not open a public issue. hadean-eon-dev@proton.me

Or use GitHub's private vulnerability reporting.

Expect an initial response within 24 hours.

Auditability

  • Main server setup: index

Sec headers here contain many "hardening" ideas: CSP/nonces, CORS, COOP/CORP. Same-origin, X-frame, explicit permissions. Referrer policy, HSTS w/ includeSubDomains

HTTPS enforcement: behind Caddy, server 301s any x-forwarded-proto: http

  • AuthN: argon2 password hashing (apps/server/src/utils/password.ts).
  • AuthZ: tRPC protectedProcedure + permission middleware (apps/server/src/utils/trpc.ts).
  • 2FA: Only through hardware backed keys (apps/server/src/utils/webauthn.ts)
  • Rate limiting: per-IP token bucket on tRPC procedures and login (apps/server/src/utils/rate-limiters/).
  • Zod escaping and normalization.

3rd party

  • Deps are validated in Renovate
  • With vulnerabilty alerts enabled and frozen to 3 days minimum release.
  • If a vuln is external please report to appropriate repo and channel. We may also downgrade/take minor patch.

Threat-model

  • Invite only model (24 chars crypto), opaque by design on endpoints.
  • Operator vs Admin: An 'admin'(or equivalent role) never gets IP or GEO. Only hashes.
  • Operator still has full logs, and can read all channel messages and default 1:1 DMs (stored as plaintext, searchable server-side).
  • 1:1 DMs are E2EE only in ephemeral mode: for those the operator sees only ciphertext, plus metadata (sender, time, file names/sizes). The DM header shows which mode is on.
  • Peer public keys are served by the server and not pinned: E2EE holds against an honest operator reading their own DB/logs, not against one who tampers with it.
  • Off-site images in messages are fetched by the server (/proxy/image, members only) and off-site video/audio never load: posting a link does not reveal viewers' IPs to the poster. The CSP img-src enforces it; only Giphy, the built-in emoji image sets and YouTube thumbnails are loaded directly.
  • The image proxy sees the image URLs it is asked for, including those inside E2EE DMs once a participant views them.
  • Made for smaller trusted communities, not for public exposure.
  • Generic exposure (I.e: notifications/search do not leak on lock-screens/E2EE)

There aren't any published security advisories