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Security hardening and auth/form fixes - #1077
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- dashboard: make demo/readonly modes read-only (delete_app, new_file, dbadmin grid, translation folder creation), fix "DEMO" typo that exposed tickets in demo mode, use safe_join for translation endpoints - Form: honour deletable=False when _delete is posted - Grid: return 403 instead of infinite recursion on non-deletable delete - auth: reject backslash/control chars in prevent_open_redirect, make reset tokens single use, use secrets for the 2FA code - URLSigner: constant-time signature comparison Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Verify-email and reset-password links were built with URL(scheme=True), whose host comes from the client-controlled Origin/Host headers, so an attacker could request a reset for a victim and have the emailed token point to a host they control. - Auth gains base_url (param, or PY4WEB_BASE_URL env var); when set, emailed links are built from it. Otherwise the previous behaviour (PY4WEB_DOMAINS, then Origin/Host) is kept for compatibility and a warning is logged. - X-Script-Name is only honoured when it is a plain path prefix, which blocks "@evil.com" style values that changed the host of absolute URLs even when PY4WEB_DOMAINS was set. - _scaffold exposes BASE_URL in settings.py. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
request_reset_password overwrote any action_token other than account-blocked, including pending-registration and pending-approval. Since login only blocks those states, registering with someone else's email (or while approval was required) and then requesting a reset let the user log in with their original password without ever verifying the email or being approved. A reset token is now only issued for active accounts (empty token or a previous reset request). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
AuthAPI.login wrote the user into the session directly, so with 2FA configured a stolen password was enough to log in via auth/api/login; only the HTML form enforced the second factor. Both API login branches (database and PAM/LDAP) now check requires_two_factor(). When 2FA is needed the pending login is stored in session as the form does, and the API returns a 401 with two_factor_url pointing at the two_factor page instead of a session. The form login uses the same helpers. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The record for details/edit/delete was fetched with table(id), ignoring the grid query, so with Grid(db.thing.owner == auth.user_id, ...) a user could read, edit or delete any row of the table by changing ?id=. The record is now selected with query & (table._id == id) (honouring left=), a non integer id is rejected, and anything outside the query redirects back to the grid like a missing record does. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
downloader() served uploads inline from the app origin with a mime type guessed from the user-supplied extension (or text/html for files stored in the database) and without nosniff, so uploading an .html or .svg file with a script was stored XSS. Only extensions in SAFE_INLINE_EXTENSIONS (raster images, audio, video, txt) are displayed inline; everything else is sent as an attachment. Every download also gets X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff and a "default-src 'none'; sandbox" CSP. Apps can pass inline_extensions= to change the list. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
With policy=None pydal's RestAPI performs no checks, so a Publisher created without a policy exposed full CRUD on every table, including GET on auth_user (password hashes), to anyone who saw the service URL printed in the page. auth was also added as an optional fixture, so no login was required. policy=None now means DENY_ALL_POLICY and auth is enforced as auth.user. Apps that relied on the old behaviour must pass an explicit policy (as the showcase example already does with ALLOW_ALL_POLICY). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
When a POST had no session cookie, Session.load read _session_token from the form or JSON body. Cross-site POSTs never carry the SameSite=Lax cookie, so a page on another site could submit the attacker's own valid token and the response would set the attacker's session in the victim's browser (login CSRF / session forcing). The comment above the code already claimed this fallback had been removed. Clients that do not keep cookies can send the token in the X-Session-Token header instead, which browsers cannot send cross-site without a CORS preflight. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- delete mode deleted the record on any POST without checking the _formkey the confirmation form already carries, so a forged or same-site cross-origin POST could delete records. The signed form key is now verified (403 if missing or invalid). - the base16 "referrer" parameter was used unchecked as the Back button href and as the redirect target, allowing javascript: XSS and open redirects. It must now be a local path or an http(s) URL on the current host; anything else, or invalid hex (previously a 500), is ignored. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
?orderby= accepted any table.field in the database, including fields that are not readable or not shown (e.g. auth_user.password or a hidden "secret" column). Sorting leaks the relative order of those values, which can be turned into an oracle, and naming another table added it to the select (cartesian product). The requested order must now match the orderby of one of the grid's columns; otherwise the default order is used. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- OAuth2: the state was generated with random.choice and never stored, so the callback accepted any code (login CSRF: an attacker could log the victim into the attacker's account). A CSPRNG state is now stored in session at login and must match on callback. Google scoped rejected a mismatching state but skipped the check when none was in session; it is now required. - next was not validated on SSO logins (open redirect); it now goes through prevent_open_redirect. - SSO callbacks, the PAM/LDAP API login and WebAuthn skipped the blocked/pending account checks and (for SSO/PAM/LDAP) two factor. Auth gains check_login_blockers() and complete_login(), used by every redirect based login; they also rotate the session uuid through store_user_in_session. - WebAuthn stored the whole auth_user row (password hash, action_token) in the session and did not rotate it; it now stores only the id via store_user_in_session, requires user verification for passwordless login, and makes the challenge single use even on failure. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
uuid1() is a timestamp plus the machine MAC address and clock sequence, which an attacker can read from any uuid1 they are given, leaving only the timestamp to guess. It was used for: - the Form CSRF signing key (_formkey) - the URLSigner per-session key and the salt included in every signed URL (which leaked the node/clock_seq) - the session uuid set at login, which is the cookie value when the session is stored server side They now come from secrets. With server side storage, changing the session uuid (login rotation, session.clear() on logout) left the old id valid in storage. Session now overwrites the old entry when the id changes, so a stolen or fixated id stops working. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The two factor code and the tries counter lived only in the session, which by default is the client side cookie. Replaying the cookie issued right after the code was sent reset the counter, so the 6 digit code could be brute forced, and the code never expired. - New AttemptCounter backed by an auth_attempt table (defined by Auth.define_tables, keys stored as sha256) counts failed tries per user; once two_factor_tries is reached the 2FA step is aborted and the guess is not even evaluated, whatever the session says. - The code expires after two_factor_lifespan seconds (default 300). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
On a request authenticated by a token plugin (SimpleTokenPlugin, JwtTokenPlugin) Auth.on_request wrote the user (the full auth_user row, password hash included, for SimpleTokenPlugin) into session["user"], and the session sent back a Set-Cookie. That cookie kept working without the token, so revoking or expiring an API token did not cut off a client that kept cookies. The token user is now stored for the current request only (in the WSGI environ). user_id, is_logged_in, get_user and auth.user/condition enforcement read it from there, and the session is left untouched. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- New passwords are hashed with pbkdf2(210000,20,sha512) (OWASP recommendation) instead of pydal's default 1000 iterations, for auth_user and the dashboard password file. Existing hashes embed their algorithm and keep working; auth_user hashes are upgraded at the next successful login. - Auth.login (form and API, including the PAM/LDAP API branch) is throttled with the server side AttemptCounter: after login_max_attempts (10) failures for an account, or login_max_attempts_per_ip (100) from one address, within login_attempts_window (600s) the password is not checked at all. A successful login resets the account counter. Set the limits to 0 to disable. - The dashboard login allows 5 failures per ip per 5 minutes (kept in memory, per process). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The dashboard index read HTTP_X_SCRIPT_NAME directly; use get_script_name() so the same path-only validation applies. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Logging in with Google for the first time created a duplicate auth_user (or failed on the unique email) for users who already had a password account. If no account has the sso_id yet and the provider asserts the email is verified, link the existing account instead. Unverified emails never link to an existing account, to prevent account takeover. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- the default validator of a list:reference field is now IS_EMPTY_OR(IS_LIST_OF(IS_IN_DB(...))), which has no .options, so the form rendered a text box with "[1, 2]". get_options now looks inside wrapping validators through .other. - since 2e44f6e form.vars only held the validated fields, so hidden fields posted with the form were lost. Submitted vars are kept again, but only validated fields (plus table fields a validation callback sets) are written to the database, never raw posted values. - test_form now sets request.app_name so it passes when run alone. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Security hardening for auth, sessions, Grid, Form, downloads, Publisher and the dashboard, plus three bug fixes reported by users (SSO duplicate accounts,
list:referencemulti-select, hidden fields inform.vars). Each commit message explains its issue and fix in detail.Upgrade notes (behavior changes)
policy=Nonenow denies everything and requires login (auth.user). Apps that relied on open access must pass an explicit policy, e.g.ALLOW_ALL_POLICY._session_token). Clients without cookies must send theX-Session-Tokenheader.base_urlon Auth or thePY4WEB_BASE_URLenv var. Without it the old Origin/Host behavior is kept and a warning is logged._scaffoldexposesBASE_URLinsettings.py.auth/api/login) enforces two factor auth: it returns 401 withtwo_factor_urlinstead of a session when 2FA is needed.login_max_attempts,login_max_attempts_per_ip,login_attempts_window; 0 disables). The dashboard allows 5 failures per IP per 5 minutes.auth_attempttable defined byAuth.define_tables(2FA tries and login throttling).inline_extensions=to change the list.?orderby=only accepts the grid's own columns; delete requires the form key; thereferrermust be a local or same-host URL.Fixes
Auth and sessions
X-Script-Name(host header poisoning of reset links).stateis stored and checked (login CSRF); SSOnextvalidated (open redirect); blocked/pending checks on every login path; WebAuthn stores only the user id and requires user verification.secrets) instead ofuuid1()for form keys, URLSigner keys and session ids.prevent_open_redirect.Grid, Form, downloads
referrerXSS and open redirect, and sorting on hidden columns are fixed.nosniffand a sandbox CSP on every download.deletable=False.Dashboard
safe_joinfor translations; validated script name.Bug fixes from user reports
auth_user(or failed on the unique email). It now links to the existing account when the provider marks the email verified (Googleemail_verified, Discordverified). An unverified email never links (account takeover risk) and gets a clear 401.list:referencefields render a multiple select again instead of a text box showing[1, 2].form.vars(regression from 2e44f6e). Only validated fields, plus fields set by avalidationcallback, are written to the database.Tests
python -m pytest tests/on a clean checkout of this branch: 177 passed (master: 136). New tests are intests/test_auth_security.py,tests/test_grid_security.pyandtests/test_form.py.🤖 Generated with Claude Code